Qualitative Diversity: Affirmative Action’s New Reframe by Ngov, Eang L.
Utah Law Review
Volume 2017 | Number 3 Article 1
6-2017
Qualitative Diversity: Affirmative Action’s New
Reframe
Eang L. Ngov
Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the
Law and Race Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Law Review by an
authorized editor of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ngov, Eang L. (2017) "Qualitative Diversity: Affirmative Action’s New Reframe," Utah Law Review: Vol. 2017 : No. 3 , Article 1.
Available at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2017/iss3/1
  
423 
QUALITATIVE DIVERSITY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION’S NEW REFRAME 
 
Eang L. Ngov* 
 
How is diversity measured? When is diversity sufficient? The 
Supreme Court has pressed these hard questions in affirmative action 
cases. With respect to college admissions, although a university campus 
might have a diverse student body, universities are beginning to justify 
the continuation of race-based affirmative action programs on the need 
for qualitative diversity, i.e., intraracial diversity—diversity within 
diversity.  
In the Court’s most recent affirmative action case, Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin, the university advanced two novel 
diversity arguments, never before employed in affirmative action cases, 
to justify its race-based admissions policy: there is a lack of diversity 
within small courses of 5–24 students, and there is a lack of diversity 
among the admitted minority students. The minorities admitted through 
the state’s Top Ten Percent program, a neutral class rank program, 
typically consisted of those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and 
who were the first in their family to attend college. The university argued 
that its race-based holistic admissions program was necessary to admit 
students who could bring viewpoints and experiences different from the 
students admitted through the Top Ten Percent Program. Others 
construed this argument as the university, in essence, wanting more 
privileged minorities with higher credentials.  
This article explores the difficulties raised by the qualitative 
diversity argument and anticipates the challenges it might wreak upon 
the Civil Rights movement. This article cautions that a reliance on 
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qualitative diversity to justify affirmative action undermines one of the 
bases upon which the Civil Rights movement was founded—to overcome 
racial stereotypes. An affirmative action program based on qualitative 
diversity also risks jeopardizing the legitimacy of affirmative action 
altogether when questions of deservedness within a race are raised and 
risks jeopardizing the united front needed to advance civil rights if 
people within a race are pitted against each other.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The implementation of race-based admissions has been hotly contested, as 
admission into universities is seen as a zero-sum game in the pursuit of a coveted 
seat among the limited number available within an entering class. A backlash 
against using affirmative action for university admissions burgeoned in some 
states.1  
In California, Proposition 209 prohibited the use of race for admissions into 
its public universities.2 The first year after Prop. 209, Asian American student 
enrollment rose substantially but African American enrollment plummeted at the 
University of California at Berkeley.3 Despite overall minority enrollment actually 
increasing, critics of Prop. 209 decried the lack of diversity at UC Berkeley.4 The 
argument centered on the lack of underrepresented minorities.5 
In Texas, the state implemented a race-neutral program to admit students 
ranked in the top 10% of their high school class into the university of their choice.6 
This program yielded one of the most diverse entering classes that the University 
of Texas-Austin (hereinafter, “UT Austin”), Texas’s flagship school, has ever 
                                                      
 1 See Eang L. Ngov, Following Fisher: Narrowly Tailoring Affirmative Action, 64 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 10–12 (2014) (discussing how voter referenda and executive orders 
against affirmative action have prompted states to apply race-neutral measures in public 
employment and education). 
2 A Brief History of Affirmative Action, OFF. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY & DIVERSITY, 
http://www.oeod.uci.edu/aa.html [https://perma.cc/F29Q-C7VZ] (last visited Apr. 30, 
2017). 
3 Tung Yin, Is “Diversity” Diverse Enough?, ASIAN AM. L.J. 89, 99 (2014); 
Challenging Race Sensitive Admission Policies, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sats/race/summary.html [https://perma.cc/6BEJ-RVM6] (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2017).  
4 Yin, supra note 3, at 99. 
5 Id. 
6 CATHERINE L. HORN & STELLA M. FLORES, PERCENT PLANS IN COLLEGE 
ADMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE STATES’ EXPERIENCES 16–23 (The 
Civil Rights Project at Harvard University ed.) (2003), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla. 
edu/research/college-access/admissions/percent-plans-in-college-admissions-a-comparative 
-analysis-of-three-states2019-experiences/horn-percent-plans-2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
WJC6-V8P6]. 
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experienced.7 At the same time, UT Austin used a race-based approach to admit 
students for the remaining seats.8 The university argued that the quality of diversity 
achieved through the race-neutral class rank program was deficient in that the 
admitted minority students were likely to be the first among their family to attend 
college and come from a lower socioeconomic class.9 The university was seeking 
to admit minority students, from more privileged backgrounds, who did not 
succeed in getting admitted through the Top Ten Percent Plan.10  
 This Article provides the first critique of the qualitative diversity argument. 
Qualitative diversity has attracted the attention of a few scholars who have written 
thoughtful works on intraracial diversity, but those works have been in defense of 
this new approach to diversity.11 Because the Court’s opinion in Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II) was devoid of any direct discussions of 
intraracial diversity when it upheld the university’s race-based policy, after the 
case’s second appearance before the Court,12 the need for a critical perspective is 
all the more present. This Article hopes to fill the void in critical scholarship about 
qualitative diversity and presents arguments that advocate for the need to anticipate 
fortifying affirmative action, should it come under siege again.  
 In Part I, this Article sets forth how qualitative diversity serves as affirmative 
action’s new “reframe.” Because race-neutral programs have achieved diversity to 
comparable levels of prior race-based measures, they threaten the support for 
affirmative action. In response, UT Austin reframed the diversity rationale, which 
                                                      
7 Darren Meritz, Top 10% Plan Has Improved Diversity at Top Texas Colleges, EL 
PASO TIMES (Jan. 23, 2004), http://theop.princeton.edu/publicity/theop/ElPasoTimes0123 
04.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4Y3-LYLT].  
8 HORN & FLORES, supra note 6, at 17. 
9 Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 
S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345), http://supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/ 
11-345.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB85-YNYF]. 
10 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2216 (2016) (Alito, 
J., dissenting); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9.  
11 See generally Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 
1130 (2013) (leaving open the normative question of whether qualitative diversity should 
be deployed, yet supporting the qualitative diversity rationale by outlining how intraracial 
delineations might advance the benefits of diversity); Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within 
Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions, 15 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 463, 463 (2012) (advancing several justifications for promoting race-conscious 
policies that increase minority representation overall as well as within minority groups); 
Elise Boddie, Commentary on Fisher: The Importance of Diversity Within Diversity, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 11, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/comment 
ary-on-fisher-the-importance-of-diversity-within-diversity [https://perma.cc/B2WE-LX7S] 
(discussing the importance of intraracial diversity). 
12 See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2217 (Alito, J., dissenting) (outlining UT Austin’s 
prior reliance on the qualitative diversity argument and pointing out that Court failed to 
address “the important issues in the case”). 
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focused on diversity between racial groups, to a more granular level.13 In adopting 
the qualitative diversity reframe, UT Austin sought to continue racial preferences 
by arguing for diversity within each racial group.14  
 In Part II, this Article discusses how this “qualitative diversity” argument 
undermines the strides made in the affirmative action movement by stretching the 
diversity rationale too thinly. One criticism that opponents will lodge at the 
insistence to achieve qualitative diversity is that it pits “brother against brother.” 
The delineation between minority groups, i.e. interracial diversity, alienates 
particular minority racial groups that are considered overrepresented and, 
therefore, not valued in the pursuit of diversity. Programs focused on 
underrepresented minorities have polarized racial groups. The qualitative diversity 
argument poses a greater risk to affirmative action because it seeks intraracial 
diversity, diversity within a racial group. For example, some scholars have argued 
that affirmative action should particularly benefit legacy Blacks who are 
descendants of slaves over Blacks who are recent immigrants.15 Arguments over 
deservedness between minority groups and within racial groups will only give 
affirmative action critics more fodder.  
 Part III highlights how the qualitative diversity approach relies on 
stereotypes, and in doing so, undermines its rationale.  Part IV discusses how the 
qualitative diversity argument is also prone to question by affirmative action critics 
because it has no logical ending point. To what level do universities plan to 
measure diversity? How refined a gradation will be applied?  
 Finally, this Article argues in Part V that the qualitative diversity argument 
opens the door for the Court to overrule Grutter v. Bollinger and Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke and retreat from its prior recognition of diversity 
as a compelling interest.16 Thus, affirmative action proponents must carefully plan 
their next move to secure diversity without losing the entire war. 
 
I.   DIVERSITY REFRAMED 
 
It has been sixty years since Brown v. Board of Education,17 yet the debate 
over affirmative action is as vigorous as ever. Previously, stakeholders battled over 
what is a sufficiently compelling purpose to allow race, even if used benignly, to 
                                                      
13 Id. at 2205–06 (pointing out UT Austin’s attempt to disclaim its prior emphasis on 
the need to achieve intraracial diversity). 
14 Id.  
15 See generally Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth: 
Affirmative Action and the Increasing Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at 
Selective Higher Educational Institutions, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1229–32 (2008) 
(questioning “the process that lumps all blacks into a single-category approach”). 
16 See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I would 
overrule Grutter.”). 
17 374 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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be considered in public employment and school admissions decisions.18 The 
Supreme Court permitted race as a consideration only in two narrow 
circumstances: remedial discrimination19 and diversity.20 It is not enough to show 
past societal discrimination because the Court has insisted that an effort to remedy 
past societal discrimination is not compelling, but rather, racial classifications may 
be used only if the entity seeking to use such classifications proves to the Court 
that the entity itself has engaged in past discrimination.21  
In Grutter v. Bollinger,22 the Court accepted diversity as a compelling interest 
because of the benefits to a student’s education and development that would flow 
from having a diverse class.23 The Court espoused the many benefits of diversity: 
to facilitate a “robust exchange of ideas,”24 increase inclusion of underrepresented 
minorities,25 contribute to the character of an institution,26 facilitate cross racial 
understanding,27 overcome racial stereotypes,28 train students for employment,29 
prepare students for leadership roles,30 and reduce racial isolation.31 Thus, diversity 
was framed as a benefit to the individual, class, and institution of higher education.  
Responding to challenges that its raced-based admissions program is no 
longer necessary because its race-neutral Top Ten Percent program produced a 
diverse entering class, the University of Texas reframed the diversity rationale in 
Fisher. The plaintiff pointed out the effectiveness of the Top Ten Percent Plan by 
comparing racial compositions in the student body population before the state’s 
prior ban on racial preferences and after the ban.32 The percentage of minorities 
enrolled through the Top Ten Percent Plan alone exceeded the percentage of 
minorities enrolled under a race-based program before the ban.33 Consequently, the 
                                                      
18 For in-depth analysis of compelling interests for racial classifications, see Eang L. 
Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision and the Equal 
Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling Interest, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2010). 
19 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).  
20 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978). 
21 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. 
22 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
23 See id. at 325. 
24 Id. at 329. 
25 See id. at 316. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. at 330. 
28 See id.  
29 Id. at 303.  
30 See id. at 332. 
31 See id. at 318–21. 
32 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592–93 
(W.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 
2411 (2013), and aff’d, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014). 
33 See Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 594–95, 603 (citing to the University Proposal, 
which conceded that the race neutral Top Ten Percent program yielded more minority 
students than pre-Hopwood race-based program). In the last year under the combined race-
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plaintiff argued that such evidence obviates the need for UT Austin to continue its 
race-based holistic admissions program.34  
Additionally, the university employed a macro level and micro level strategy 
to reframe the diversity rationale. At the macro level, UT Austin argued that a 
raced-based admissions program was necessary to achieve a critical mass of 
qualitatively diverse students within its student body.35 Diversity was reframed to 
encompass intraracial diversity.36 At the micro level, UT Austin argued that it had 
not achieved critical mass in its small classes.37 
To the extent that the qualitative diversity approach relies on the same 
rationales and means of implementation as the broader diversity rationale, the 
qualitative diversity approach is vulnerable to the same criticisms articulated 
against the diversity rationale. To the extent that qualitative diversity seeks to 
refine the diversity inquiry, it invites new criticisms not previously relevant to the 
broader diversity pursuit. 
 
II.   DESERVEDNESS 
 
Evaluating qualitative diversity invites questions of deservedness and how 
deservedness will be determined. The Court has entertained two measures of 
deservedness; each measure has implications for interracial groups as well as 
intraracial groups. 
 
A.  What Does Diversity Mean?—Squeezing out Asian Americans 
 
A quest to find the meaning of diversity must begin with the following 
pronouncement by the Grutter Court, upholding the University of Michigan’s race-
based admissions policy:  
 
The policy does, however, reaffirm the Law School’s longstanding 
commitment to “one particular type of diversity,” that is, “racial and 
ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from 
groups which have been historically discriminated against, like African–
Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this 
                                                      
neutral holistic and Top Ten Percent programs, “[t]he 2004 entering class thus had a higher 
percentage of African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Hispanics than the class that 
entered in 1996, when UT had last employed racial preferences.” Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at 
Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2218 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
34 See Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 603. 
35 See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2219 (Alito, J., dissenting); Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 9, at 43. 
36 See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2219–20 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
37 See Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 603 (citing to the University’s Proposal, which 
claimed “race-neutral efforts have failed to improve racial diversity within the class 
room”); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2226 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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commitment might not be represented in our student body in meaningful 
numbers.” By enrolling a “critical mass of [underrepresented] minority 
students,” the Law School seeks to “ensur[e] their ability to make unique 
contributions to the character of the Law School.”38 
 
Through these two statements, Justice O’Connor appeared to convey two 
purposes for diversity: 1) a social justice concern, manifested through her reference 
to historical discrimination in the first statement; and 2) a focus on contributions to 
a school as expressed in the second statement. Within the framework of these two 
statements, this Part explores who may be considered for diversity. Because 
African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans have been incorporated into 
these goals through Justice O’Connor’s express reference to these racial groups, 
the question remains: What of the Asian Americans? 
In one breath, it appeared that Asian Americans would be part of the diversity 
discussion, and yet in another, Asian Americans were excluded. Initially, the first 
statement seemed to suggest that Asian Americans were intended to be included as 
the Court referred to groups that have been historically discriminated. To be clear, 
under a compensatory rationale for affirmative action, there is an argument that 
African Americans should be the sole beneficiaries of affirmative action.39 But 
Justice O’Connor’s inclusion of other groups, such as Hispanics, leads one to 
                                                      
38 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (alteration in original) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). 
39 See Frank Wu, Neither Black or White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 
15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 263 (1995). Dean Wu recognizes that “[t]he compensatory 
rationale makes it difficult to justify affirmative action, as it is presently practiced, for any 
racial group other than African Americans.” Id. Professor Pat Chew poses several questions 
relevant to deciding how an affirmative action program premised on remedial past 
discrimination should be implemented: 
 
Are some types of past discrimination more extreme and hence more 
worthy of remedy than others? For instance, should one compare the slavery of 
African Americans to the deprivation of the property and lives of the Native 
American tribes to the riots, lynching, and internment of Asian Americans? And 
if so, how? 
At what point should preferential treatment on the basis of past 
discrimination cease? Have Asian Americans and Jewish Americans, but not 
other minority groups reached that point? 
Should everyone in a particular minority group be included or should an 
individual have to show a more direct link to past discrimination? For instance, 
should an individual have to trace his or her relationship to a Japanese American 
World War II internee or to a Chinese American “coolie” who was lynched? 
 
Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The “Reticent” Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1, 90 (1994). 
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believe that she had intended the diversity rationale to apply to other historically 
disadvantaged groups, in addition to African Americans.  
 That Asian Americans faced historical discrimination is not contestable.40 At 
the federal level, Asian Americans were discriminated against in mass numbers. In 
the mid-1800s, over 6,000 Chinese laborers were imported as part of a slave trade, 
and 4,000 of them perished through their consignment to work in the Peruvian 
guano pits.41 Not long after their arrival, the oppression and discrimination 
continued through the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which imposed a ten-year 
restriction on Chinese immigration into the U.S and was the “first time [that] 
Federal law proscribed entry of an ethnic working group on the premise that it 
endangered the good order of certain localities.”42 Subsequent laws restricted 
Chinese immigrants from seeking naturalization.43 During World War II, after his 
declaration that the Pearl Harbor bombing of the U.S. would be a date that would 
“live in infamy,” President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed his own infamous 
Executive Order 9066, forcibly removing 117,000 Japanese Americans from their 
homes and incarcerating them in mass concentration44 camps.45 Two-thirds of 
these Japanese Americans were U.S. citizens born on U.S. soil.46  
                                                      
40 For an extensive discussion of discrimination against Asian Americans, see Chew, 
supra note 39; Wu, supra note 39.  
41 Chew, supra note 39, at 9–10 n.15.  
42 Chinese Exclusion Act, H.R. 5-804, 47th Cong. (1882), 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=47 [https://perma.cc/RDA3-
8FL3] (last visited May 1, 2017); see also Chew, supra note 39, at 13–15; Wu, supra note 
39, at 232–33 (relating the social and racial tension that led to the Chinese Exclusion Act).  
43 Chinese Exclusion Act, H.R. 5-804, 47th Cong. (1882), 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=47 [https://perma.cc/RDA3-
8FL3] (last visited May 1, 2017). 
44 Although the forced relocation of Japanese Americans has been commonly referred 
to as an internment, the Fred T. Korematsu Institute points out that the term “internment” is 
inappropriate: “Internment literally refers to the confinement or impounding of enemy 
aliens during a war (Merriam-Webster, 2011). Although thousands of people of Japanese 
ancestry were incarcerated during World War II, they were not ‘enemy aliens.’ Moreover, 
they were not simply ‘confined’ into camps.” Terminology, FRED T. KOREMATSU INST., 
http://www.korematsuinstitute.org/terminology-1 [https://perma.cc/9ZCR-R49M] (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2017). 
45 Teaching with Documents: Documents and Photographs Related to Japanese 
Relocation During World War II, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/education/ 
lessons/japanese-relocation/ [https://perma.cc/UAK3-NHY6] (last visited Mar. 24, 2017) 
[hereinafter National Archives, Teaching with Documents]; see also Harvey Gee, Review 
Essay: Asian Americans, Critical Race Theory, and the End of the Model Minority Myth, 
19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 149, 167–70 (2009); Chew, supra note 39, at 10–11 
n.17 (detailing the plight of Japanese Americans); Wu, supra note 39, at 234–36 
(discussing the social and political climate that led to the Japanese Americans’ 
incarceration).  
46 National Archives, Teaching with Documents, supra note 45. 
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At the local level, Asian Americans faced a double-edged sword of being 
presumed to have benefited from affirmative action, while in reality they suffered 
from discriminatory admissions policies.47 For example, San Francisco’s elite 
magnet school, Lowell High School, raised the admissions standards for Chinese 
American applicants to maintain a cap imposed by a consent decree.48 Lowell 
accepted 30% more White students than Chinese American students, despite that 
half of the admitted Whites were outperformed by all of the Chinese American 
students on entrance exams.49 Additionally, the University of California at 
Berkeley School of Law, otherwise known as Boalt Hall, discriminated against 
Asian Americans when it implemented in 1975 a policy that denied Japanese 
Americans special admissions and capped admissions of Chinese, Korean, and 
Filipino applicants to less than 3% of all special admits.50 Similar policies at 
Brown, Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, UCLA, and UC Berkeley were challenged 
because fewer Asian Americans were admitted than Whites, despite the “dramatic” 
increase of Asian American applicants.51  
When Justice Douglas considered whether admissions policies could allot 
seats for admissions based on past harm, he noted that “there is no Western State 
                                                      
47 Wu, supra note 39, at 226 (“Indeed, Asian Americans frequently are imagined as 
the beneficiaries of special consideration, although they almost always are excluded from 
race-based college admissions and employment programs.”); accord Chew, supra note 39, 
at 75. 
48 Nancy Chung Allred, Asian Americans and Affirmative Action: From Yellow Peril 
to Model Minority and Back Again, 14 ASIAN AM. L.J. 57, 60 (2007); Caitlin M. Liu, 
Recent Development, Beyond Black and White: Chinese Americans Challenge San 
Francisco’s Desegregation Plan, 5 ASIAN L.J. 341, 343 (1998). 
49 Allred, supra note 48, at 60; Liu, supra note 48, at 343.  
50 Sharon S. Lee, The De-Minoritization of Asian Americans: A Historical 
Examination of the Representations of Asian Americans in Affirmative Action Admissions 
Policies at the University of California, 15 ASIAN AM. L.J. 129, 137 (2008). 
51 Id. at 144; Chew, supra note 39, at 63; Wu, supra note 39, at 268–69. Currently, 
Harvard faces a lawsuit for its allegedly discriminatory admissions policy that caps Asian 
American admissions. Kirk Carapezza, Is Harvard Showing Bias Against Asian-
Americans?, NPR (May 20, 2015, 4:37 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2015/05/20/ 
408240998/is-harvard-showing-bias-against-asian-americans [https://perma.cc/ST35-
TZDQ]. For similar stories, see Melissa Chen, Why the Asian-American Lawsuit Against 
Harvard Is Doomed to Fail, HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 15, 2015, 3:08 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-chen/why-the-asianamerican-law_b_7799098.html 
[https://perma.cc/M3A9-FB5X]; Maxim Lott, Rejected Asian Students Sue Harvard over 
Admissions that Favor Other Minorities, FOXNEWS (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/11/18/rejected-asian-students-sue-harvard-over-
admissions-that-favor-other-minorities.html [https://perma.cc/G7DD-6Q3F]; Charles 
Wheelan, A Case for Preferential Treatment?: Accusations that Harvard Is Biased Against 
Asian-American Applicants Highlight Admissions Decision, Trade-Offs, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPS. (June 9, 2015, 4:20 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/charles-
wheelan/2015/06/09/claims-of-harvard-bias-against-asian-americans-show-admissions-
trade-offs [https://perma.cc/LLF7-D62J]. 
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which can claim that it has always treated Japanese and Chinese in a fair and 
evenhanded manner.”52 But remarkably, Asian Americans were noticeably absent 
from the list of racial groups specified in the Justice O’Connor’s first statement as 
having suffered historical discrimination.  
The second statement appeared to have intended to include Asian Americans, 
as it referred to students who can make “unique contributions to the character” of a 
school.53 Yet, this second statement also left Asians out of consideration for 
contributions to diversity benefits when Justice O’Connor inserted the word 
“underrepresented” before the word “minority.”54 The inclusion of Asian 
Americans in the diversity discussion hinges on the modifier “underrepresented,” 
which prompts the question: What does underrepresented mean? The Merriam-
Webster dictionary defines underrepresented as “inadequately represented”55 and 
overrepresented to mean “represented excessively; especially: having 
representatives in a proportion higher than the average.”56  
In 2008, the number of Hispanics enrolled at UT Austin outnumbered the 
number of Asians, 1,339 Hispanics compared to 1,248 Asians.57 Thus, there was a 
greater of percentage of Hispanics than Asians in UT Austin’s entering class. Yet, 
the Fifth Circuit construed Hispanics as underrepresented and Asian Americans as 
overrepresented at UT Austin: 
 
The mere fact that the gross number of Hispanic students attending UT 
exceeds the gross number of Asian–American students attending UT 
does not mean Hispanics are not an “underrepresented” minority group. 
Hispanic students remain underrepresented at UT when their student 
population as a percentage of the entire UT population is compared to 
Texas’ Hispanic and Latino population. According to the latest statistics 
from the United States Census Bureau, Texas’ population is 36 percent 
Hispanic or Latino. In contrast, in 2008 only 20 percent of admitted 
and/or enrolled UT students were Hispanic. Thus, compared to their 
percentage of Texas’ population as a whole, Hispanics remain 
underrepresented. Asian–Americans, on the other hand, are largely 
overrepresented compared to their percentage of Texas’ population.58  
                                                      
52 Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 338 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
53 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003). 
54 See id. 
55 Underrepresented, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/underrepresented [https://perma.cc/8FFM-966R] (last visited May 8, 2017). 
56 Overrepresented, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/overrepresented [https://perma.cc/U7ZG-HFZJ] (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
57 Office of Info. Mgmt. & Analysis, Common Data Set 2008-2009, U. TEX. AUSTIN, 
https://sps.austin.utexas.edu/sites/ut/IRRIS/CDS/IMA_PUB_CDS_2008_AY.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B77A-QKYQ]. 
58 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 606 (W.D. Tex. 2009) 
(citations omitted). 
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The Fifth Circuit’s formulation of overrepresentation and underrepresentation 
sought to mirror the state’s racial population, which can be challenged as 
amounting to racial balancing as proscribed by the Supreme Court.59 
 Incidentally, it is ironic that although UT Austin relied on the racial isolation 
as a justification for qualitative diversity, it neglected to consider the isolation 
faced by Asian Americans. As Justice Alito keenly noted,  
 
If, on the other hand, state demographics are not driving UT’s interest in 
avoiding racial isolation, then its treatment of Asian-American students 
is hard to understand. As the District Court noted, “the gross number of 
Hispanic students attending UT exceeds the gross number of Asian-
American students.” In 2008, for example, UT enrolled 1,338 Hispanic 
freshmen and 1,249 Asian-American freshmen. UT never explains why 
the Hispanic students—but not the Asian-American students—are 
isolated and lonely enough to receive an admissions boost, 
notwithstanding the fact that there are more Hispanics than Asian-
Americans in the student population. The anecdotal statements from UT 
officials certainly do not indicate that Hispanics are somehow lonelier 
than Asian-Americans.60 
 
Thus, the pursuit of diversity over the concern of students feeling isolated has once 
again squeezed out Asian Americans. 
 Another way that Asians have been left out of the diversity pursuit is through 
mirroring admissions of racial groups to the applicant pool. Such proportioning 
causes Asian Americans to be construed as an overrepresented group and is 
another form of balancing that disadvantages Asian Americans. Professor Tung 
Yin points out that many campuses have embraced a narrow conception of 
diversity that focuses on correlating admissions for minority groups with applicant 
pools, allowing for admissions of minority groups in equal proportion to each 
other, except for Whites: Schools universally allot 5%–12% of its admissions for 
each minority group and 65%–70% for Whites.61  
                                                      
59 See infra Part V.A.3. 
60 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2236 (2016) (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
61 Yin, supra note 3, at 96. Professor Yin offers a novel formulation for diversity—
that the percentage of admissions relegated to be shared among Asians, Blacks, Latinos, 
and Other be redistributed in order that one minority racial group may have a greater 
percentage at some schools. Thus, he proposes that the overall White to non-White 
proportion at all law schools can be maintained, but minority groups need not be evenly 
divided at each school. Id. at 91–92. For example, he suggests that instead of each school 
admitting one to four Native Americans, some schools would have zero while others would 
have amassed the bulk of Native American students. Id. at 105–06. The benefit of this 
proposal, he suggests, would reduce the potential for the one to four Native Americans to 
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When this balance is disturbed, cries of lack of diversity can be heard. For 
example, Frontline reported that when California’s Prop. 209 ban on race-based 
preferences for admissions became effective in its undergraduate campuses, the 
University of California at Berkeley “accepted its least diverse freshman class in 
17 years, admitting 56 percent fewer blacks and 49 percent fewer Latinos than in 
1997,”62 despite the fact that Asians outnumbered Whites.63 In another instance, 
when Black students amounted to only 0.9% of the student body at the California 
Institute of Technology (“Caltech”), the Journal of Blacks in Higher Education 
assailed Caltech as “[t]he Whitest of the Nation’s 25 Highest-Ranked 
Universities.”64 In 2008 Caltech’s entering class consisted of less than 1% Black 
and 6% Hispanic students.65 In that same year, Caltech’s Asian student population 
(at 40%) exceeded Whites (at 39%). However, Harvard, rather than Caltech, was 
lauded for admitting the “most diverse” entering class in its history when it 
admitted an entering class of 60% Whites.66  
Many colleges and universities have adopted a conception of diversity that 
mirrors proportions of the applicant pool.67 Law schools, in particular, follow this 
narrow conception of diversity. The application pool to ABA accredited law 
schools has hovered around 60%–65% White, and for Black, Asian Americans, 
and Latinos, each group ranged from 5% to 12%.68 Law school admissions tend to 
reflect the ABA applicant pool distribution: “around 60–70 percent white students, 
with the remainder divided fairly evenly among Asian American, African 
American, and Latino/Hispanic American students, with a handful of Native 
American students.”69 
                                                      
feel racially isolated. Id. Professor Yin concludes that each school does not need “the same 
or similar kind of diversity. Rather, what is important is that across all comparable 
institutions (and in particular, elite institutions) there exists sufficient diversity.” Id. at 127.  
62 Id. at 99; Challenging Race Sensitive Admission Policies, supra note 3.  
63 See Yin, supra note 3, at 99 n.30 (citing other characterizations of decreased 
diversity after Prop. 209). 
64 See id. at 102 (alteration in original).  
65 See id. (citing Russell K. Nieli, Why Caltech is in a Class by Itself, MINDING THE 
CAMPUS (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.mindingthecampus.org/2010/12/why_caltech_is_in_a 
_class_by_i/ [https://perma.cc/TM25-UJ2E]). 
66 See id. (quoting College Class of 2010 is the Most Diverse in Harvard History, 
HARV. UNIV. GAZETTE (Apr. 6, 2006), http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2006/04.06/ 
03-admissions.html [https://perma.cc/Q7MJ-MCB3]). 
67 See id. at 91, 96–97 (noting that most law schools have a minority student 
population between 17.6 and 30.8 percent). 
68 See id., at 96; see also ACCESS GROUP, 2015 LEGAL EDUCATION DATA DECK: KEY 
TRENDS ON ACCESS, AFFORDABILITY, AND VALUE 5 (2015), 
https://www.accessgroup.org/system/tdf/2015_legal_education_data_deck.pdf?file=1&type
=node&id=406. [https://perma.cc/MGG3-HGVZ]. 
69 See Yin, supra note 3, at 89. 
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Some idealized that a diverse school would consist of 20% White, Black, 
Asian, Hispanic, and Other.70 Some lower courts, however, have rejected such 
propositions: “[N]othing in Grutter requires a university to give equal preference 
to every minority group.”71 But if courts were to permit or require this idealized 
standard, Berkeley, Caltech, and Harvard could hardly be described as diverse 
under this standard. Yet, neither would Howard University. The student racial 
composition of Howard is “0.8% American Indian/Alaskan Native, 1.4% Asian, 
95.3% Black/African-American, 0.5% Hispanic/Latino, 0.0% Multi-race (not 
Hispanic/Latino), 0.2% Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander, 1.9% White, [and] 0.0% 
Unknown.”72 Putting aside Howard’s historical origins as a Historically Black 
College and University (HBCU), no one would think to criticize Howard for its 
abysmal admission of Native American, Asian, and Hispanic students as lacking in 
diversity. To be clear, the Author is not suggesting that there is anything wrong 
with Howard’s admissions73 but only raises its admissions statistics as a foil to 
prompt conversations about what diversity means.74  
 
B.  Intraracial Diversity 
 
Equally elusive is the question of what qualitative diversity means. This 
section examines how qualitative diversity will be determined with respect to class, 
the distinction between immigrant Blacks and legacy Blacks, and intraracial Asian 
American groups, which naturally prompts inquiries into the deservedness of each 
of these groups. 
 
1.  The Privileged 
 
The dialogue initiated by the Justices during oral arguments in the Fisher case 
captured the Justices’ concern over conceptualization and implementation of 
qualitative diversity:  
 
                                                      
70 See Deirdre M. Bowen, American Skin: Dispensing with Colorblindness and 
Critical Mass in Affirmative Action, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 339, 384 (2011); see also Yin, 
supra note 3, at 108.  
71 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 606 (W.D. Tex. 2009).  
72 Howard University Overview, C. DATA, http://www.collegedata.com/cs/data/ 
college/college_pg01_tmpl.jhtml?schoolId=1024 [https://perma.cc/42ZU-22KN] (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2017).  
73 In fact, Blacks attending Howard and other HCBUs are better prepared for graduate 
schools than those who attend colleges and universities with predominately White student 
populations. See Yin, supra note 3, at 110. 
74 If one were to employ a White vs. non-White conception of diversity, then in a 
comparison of the four schools, Howard would rank at the top, and Caltech and Berkeley 
would be second, with Harvard trailing behind. 
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Mr. Garre: . . . . And I don’t think it’s been seriously disputed in this—
this case to this point that, although the percentage plan certainly helps 
with minority admissions, by and large, the—the minorities who are 
admitted tend to come from segregated, racially-identifiable schools. 
 
Justice Alito: Well, I thought that the whole purpose of affirmative action 
was to help students who come from underprivileged backgrounds, but 
you make a very different argument that I don’t think I’ve ever seen 
before. The top 10 percent plan admits lots of African Americans—lots 
of Hispanics and a fair number of African Americans. But you say, well, 
it’s—it’s faulty because it doesn’t admit enough African Americans and 
Hispanics who come from privileged backgrounds. And you specifically 
have the example of the child of successful professionals in Dallas. Now, 
that’s your—that’s your argument? If you . . . have an applicant whose 
parents are—let’s say they’re—one of them is a partner in your law firm 
in Texas, another one is . . . another corporate lawyer. They have income 
that puts them in the top 1 percent of earners in the country, and they 
have—parents both have graduate degrees. They deserve a leg-up 
against, let’s say, an Asian or a white applicant whose parents are 
absolutely average in terms of education and income? 
 
Mr. Garre: No, Your Honor. . . . 
 
Justice Alito: Well, how can the answer to that question be no, because 
being an African American or being a Hispanic is a plus factor. 
 
Mr. Garre: Because, Your Honor, our point is, is that we want minorities 
from different backgrounds. We go out of our way to recruit minorities 
from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
 
Justice Kennedy: So what you’re saying is that what counts is race above 
all? 
 
. . . . 
 
Justice Kennedy: You want underprivileged of a certain race and 
privileged of a certain race. So that’s race.75 
 
As Justice Alito’s question highlights, the qualitative diversity argument risks 
undermining affirmative action through the attention that the approach gives to 
                                                      
75 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 43–45. 
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privileged minorities.76 UT Austin’s justification that its raced-based policy is an 
effort to bring diverse viewpoints beyond those attained through the Top Ten 
Percent program naturally links UT Austin’s qualitative diversity approach to 
privileged minorities.77 Because studies show that affirmative action tends to 
benefit affluent minorities, UT Austin’s desire to use its race-based admissions 
program to reach other minorities outside of the Top Ten Percent program will 
result in increased admissions for the privileged.78  
Assuming arguendo that UT Austin was genuinely interested in admitting 
privileged minorities to overcome racial stereotypes and promote cross racial 
understanding, rather than to maintain its prestigious ranking through the 
admissions of privileged minorities with higher credentials,79 the argument for 
qualitative diversity would actually militate against allowing racial preferences for 
the university’s holistic review. Because of the broad perception that affirmative 
action benefits privileged minorities—who are first-generation and second-
generation Blacks—over underprivileged minorities,80 racial stereotypes would 
                                                      
76 Professor Carbado suggests that the appropriate response would be to remind 
Justice Alito that helping underprivileged students was not constitutionally sanctioned for 
affirmative action. He offers that the University should have explained that diversity has 
been the constitutionally accepted rationale for affirmative action and that intraracial 
diversity would advance that rationale. Carbado, supra note 11, at 1180. While it is true 
that diversity, rather than remedying societal discrimination, garnered constitutional 
traction, some advocates conflate the remedial rationale with the diversity rationale. The 
Reverend Jesse Jackson, for example, asserted that “Universities have to give weight to the 
African-American experience because that is for whom affirmative action was aimed in the 
first place. That intent must be honored.” Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of 
Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1150–51 (2007). 
77 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2241–42 (Alito, 
J., dissenting). 
78 See Ngov, supra note 1, at 23–25 (discussing the impact of socioeconomic status 
on college admissions); see also University Race-Sensitive Admissions Programs Are Not 
Helping Black Students Who Most Need Assistance, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., 
http://www.jbhe.com/news_views/56_race_sensitive_not_helping.html [https://perma.cc/ 
L8WM-KNBJ] (last visited Mar. 27, 2017) (examining the socioeconomic background of 
black students at selective colleges). 
79 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 
135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015). The data show that students admitted through the race-based 
holistic review possess higher credentials than those admitted through the Top Ten Percent 
program. Judge Higginbotham observed, “With each entering class, there was a gap 
between the lower standardized test scores of students admitted under the Top Ten Percent 
Plan and the higher scores of those admitted under holistic review . . . A gap persisted not 
only among students overall and white students, but also among racial and ethnic minority 
students.” Id. 
80 Professor Lani Guinier observes that 
 
admissions decisions recreate a “geography of unequal opportunity” in which 
suburban students succeed and rural and urban students are left behind. 
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more likely be dismantled by admitting more impoverished minority students, like 
those admitted through the Top Ten Percent program. Similarly, because first-
generation and second-generation Blacks comprise over 40% of black students at 
Ivy League universities,81 a critic is likely to point out that if qualitative diversity is 
the goal of race-based policies, then the diversity attained through the Top Ten 
Percent program would be diluted through UT Austin’s race-based program, which 
is more likely to admit first-generation and second-generation Blacks. As Professor 
Onwuachi-Willig has argued,  
 
the[] overrepresentation [of mixed-race, first-generation, and second-
generation black students] at elite institutions of learning does not 
necessarily advance the factors that are commonly viewed as the primary 
benefits of diversity. . . . In other words, overrepresentation of certain 
groups of Blacks, such as second-generation West Indian Blacks or 
Blacks from the Northeast, decreases the likelihood of differing 
viewpoints in the classroom and on campus . . . .82  
 
The purpose of this discussion is not to advance a particular notion of whether 
privileged as opposed to impoverished Blacks, or whether first-generation and 
second-generation Blacks as opposed to legacy Blacks, better facilitate the benefits 
of diversity. But rather, the purpose is to bring to the forefront that UT Austin’s 
qualitative diversity argument may undermine the very benefits of diversity it 
seeks to realize. 
 
2.  Legacy Blacks versus Immigrant Blacks 
 
The question of deservedness has been entwined with distinctions between 
legacy Blacks, who are descendant of slaves, and immigrant blacks. “Many argue 
                                                      
 . . . Risk-averse admissions officers cherry pick among applicants of color and 
fail to recruit in urban or rural public schools.  
Many colleges rely on private networks that disproportionately benefit the 
children of African and West Indian immigrants who come from majority black 
countries and who arrived in the United States after 1965. Affluent, well-
educated new immigrants from South America bolster Latino diversity statistics 
while the children of migrant farm workers are left behind.  
 
Lani Guinier, Opinion, Our Preference for the Privileged, BOS. GLOBE (July 9, 2004), at 
A13, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/guinier/publications/preference.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/B2VZ-N5LY]. Accord Carbado, supra note 11, at 1181 (recognizing the 
“general criticism of affirmative action—namely, that the policy only benefits class-
privileged blacks”).  
81 Douglas S. Massey et al., Black Immigrants and Black Natives Attending Selective 
Colleges and Universities in the United States, 113 AM. J. EDUC. 243, 248 tbl. 1 (2007); 
Brown & Bell, supra note 15, at 1249–54; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 76, at 1147.  
82 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 76, at 1184–85. 
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that it was students like these [i.e., the descendants of slaves], disadvantaged by the 
legacy of Jim Crow laws, segregation and decades of racism, poverty and inferior 
schools, who were intended as principal beneficiaries of affirmative action in 
university admissions.”83 For example,  
 
[t]he president of Amherst College, Anthony W. Marx, says that 
colleges should care about the ethnicity of black students because in 
overlooking those with predominantly American roots, colleges are 
missing an “opportunity to correct a past injustice” and depriving their 
campuses “of voices that are particular to being African-American, with 
all the historical disadvantages that that entails.”84  
 
Similarly, Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig argues that immigrant Blacks 
have garnered the benefits of affirmative action in greater proportion to legacy 
Blacks, and she proposes that although immigrant Blacks should not be excluded, 
schools should consider ancestral heritage as part of their racial preference in 
making admissions decisions.85 She draws upon differences between legacy Blacks 
and immigrant Blacks in education, culture, and economics to support her claim.86 
Although Professor Onwuachi-Willig is careful not to explicitly state this,87 the 
question lurking in the background is whether black descendants of slavery have a 
stronger claim for affirmative action than immigrant Blacks. After building her 
case for greater inclusion of legacy Blacks, Professor Onwuachi-Willig takes care 
to refute any insinuations that immigrant Blacks should be excluded from 
affirmative action considerations. Professors Kevin Brown and Jeannine Bell, on 
the other hand, expressly argue that legacy Blacks, or to use their phrase 
“Ascendants,” have a greater entitlement to affirmative action: “From the 
perspective of the struggle of blacks in the United States to overcome the historical 
racism here, however, the descendants of those blacks who suffered from racism in 
this country should receive priority. After all, their parents did not choose to come 
to the United States.”88 Therefore, if the answer is yes to the question of whether 
legacy Blacks have a stronger claim to affirmative action, then critics are likely to 
argue that not all Blacks should be given a “plus” for affirmative action 
                                                      
83 Sara Rimer & Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More Blacks, But Which 
Ones?, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/24/us/top-colleges-
take-more-blacks-but-which-ones.html [https://perma.cc/5SAX-ZU9W]. 
84 Id. 
85 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 77, at 1144–49, 1157–58. 
86 Id. at 1157–58; see Brown & Bell, supra note 15, at 1265 (distinguishing 
differences between immigrant and ascendant Blacks). 
87 But see Yin, supra note 3, at 116 (interpreting Onwuachi-Willig’s work as arguing 
“that affirmative action programs should specially benefit legacy blacks, who have suffered 
the worst effects of discrimination and oppression”). 
88 Brown & Bell, supra note 15, at 1236. 
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admissions—even under a qualitative diversity approach that encompasses a 
compensatory motive for affirmative action.  
Because the qualitative diversity argument relies on intraracial distinctions, it 
necessarily implicates questions of deservedness—a question that risks exclusion 
of subgroups within a racial group. If racial preferences are given for social justice 
concerns, qualitative diversity leads to the question of which group has suffered 
more. Consider the example of Professor Onwuachi-Willig’s discussion about the 
discriminatory experiences of legacy Blacks and immigrant Blacks. She explains 
that immigrant Blacks do not suffer stigma and maltreatment as acutely as legacy 
Blacks because they are more likely to be viewed by Whites as “good Blacks” as 
opposed to “bad Blacks,”89 which facilitates their inclusion in communities and 
schools.  But others opine that immigrant Blacks experience as great or even 
greater discrimination at the hands of legacy Blacks.90  
 
In fact, studies have shown that one reason why some first- and second-
generation Blacks may work to form identities separate from legacy 
Blacks is the negative social treatment that they have experienced from 
legacy Blacks, such as taunting because of accents and family dress. 
Immigrant Blacks often experience deeper hurt as a result of such 
criticism from legacy Blacks than from Whites. In this sense, first- and 
second-generation black Americans suffer a double discrimination that 
many African-Americans do not have to endure, both the disadvantage of 
blackness in a racist American society and the disadvantage of foreign-
ness in a nationalist society.91  
 
Thus, the purpose of this discussion is not to debate who has been more 
aggrieved but to point out that a conception of qualitative diversity that includes 
delineations of merit based on past suffering inescapably requires weighing of past 
harms. Of course, a response might be to include all those who suffer 
discrimination, but when seats at elite colleges are limited, inevitably, line drawing 
on the basis of past harms will have to be made. Justice Douglas, when he opposed 
affirmative action on the premise for redressing historical harms, was attuned to 
the “slippery slope”92 nature of making such valuations in “the . . . attempt to 
                                                      
89 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 76, at 1177. 
90 Immigrant Blacks “have negative experiences of rejection from Ascendants who 
may also see them as different.” Brown & Bell, supra note 15, at 1271. Similarly, bi-racial 
black students feel alienation and perhaps discrimination by monoracial blacks. Id. at 1262. 
“Some 40% of the biracial black students described negative experiences with other blacks 
compared to only 12% of the monoracial black students.” Id. 
91 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 76, at 1203. 
92 Yena Lee, Asian Americans and Affirmative Action: Through the Study of Fisher v. 
University of Texas, 5 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 127, 133 (2013); Wu, 
supra note 39, at 258. 
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assess how grievously each group has suffered from discrimination, and allocate 
proportions accordingly.”93  
On the other hand, if qualitative diversity focuses on racial diversity, the 
qualitative diversity argument leads to the question of who is more Black, Asian, 
Hispanic, Native American, etc. For example, Professor Onwuachi-Willig is 
concerned about students who do not “live the experiences of racial minorities” 
but, nevertheless, claim minority status on college applications by virtue of their 
biology, as determined by genetic testing.94 Although one might characterize their 
actions as a “fraud” and “misrepresentation,”95 a critic might argue that one is 
implicitly questioning if these students are “black enough” or “Asian enough” and 
the like. One might conclude that those individuals who only have a biological 
component of minority ancestry but otherwise live white lives “seemingly bring 
very little to the table in terms of promoting cross-racial understanding and 
exchange.”96 Yet, an argument can be made that there is value to the experiences 
of those who “grew up White” but later discover their partial ethnic heritage. 
Perhaps they might have a new found appreciation for minorities and can speak 
from the perspective of someone with a newly found ethnic background.  
For another example, consider the conclusion of some scholars that 
 
many Black/White Biracials are less likely than Ascendants to ensure the 
unique contributions to the character of education at a selective higher 
education program. As a result, some of the benefits of making 
classroom discussions more lively, spirited and more enlightening are 
lost. Ascendants are also more likely to contribute more to the benefits of 
cross-racial understanding that enables students to understand better 
persons of different races than many Black/White Biracials.97 
 
Those scholars make an identical conclusion regarding the superior ability of 
“Ascendants” or legacy Blacks over those of immigrant Blacks to promote cross 
racial understanding and contribute to robust classroom discussions.98 Again, an 
argument can be made that Black/White Biracials might have more to offer in 
contributing to classroom discussions than monoracial Blacks because they have 
exposure to a greater variety of social and cultural experiences, which benefit them 
in facilitating cross racial understanding. Likewise, immigrant Blacks might better 
foster cross racial understanding than legacy Blacks because they have been 
discriminated against by both Whites and legacy Blacks.99 
                                                      
93 Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 338 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
94 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 76, at 1217–19. 
95 Id. at 1217. 
96 Id. at 1219. 
97 Brown & Bell, supra note 15, at 1264. 
98 Id. at 1274–75. 
99 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
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The point is not to debate which is the right conclusion to draw about biracial 
Blacks, immigrant Blacks, or applicants who discover their ethnic heritage through 
genetic testing, but rather that the conclusions drawn, whatever they may be, 
necessarily question deservedness among intraracial groups. Through these 
contested inquiries of deservedness, a qualitative diversity approach to school 
admissions risks intraracial balkanization.100  
 The Model Minority label101 ascribed to Asians serves as a current example of 
interracial fragmentation102 and is instructive for the potential of intraracial 
fragmentation. The phrase Model Minority conveys the image of Asian Americans 
as hardworking, intelligent, and focused on achievement, and that through these 
attributes, Asian Americans succeed in American society.103 The origins of the 
Model Minority myth can be traced to the arrival of the Chinese laborers, 
“Coolies,” imported through a slave trade to work at plantations and factories.104 In 
an effort to “punish the negro for having abandoned the control of his old master,” 
the Chinese laborers were praised for being “more obedient and industrious than 
the negro.”105 To attack the Irish, The New York Times contrasted the Chinese 
laborers from the Irish immigrants: “‘John Chinaman’ was a better addition to 
society than was ‘Paddy’” because the Chinese were not prone to excessive 
drinking and violence.106 In the mid-1960s, the phrase “model minority” was 
coined, and the image was propelled by an article featured in the New York Times 
Sunday Magazine that praised Japanese Americans as “a minority that has risen 
above even prejudiced criticism.”107 The article proclaimed that “[b]y any criterion 
of good citizenship that we choose, the Japanese Americans are better than any 
group in our society, including native-born whites.”108 
  
                                                      
100 For example, “[e]ven among black scholars there is disagreement on whether a 
discussion about the origins of black students is helpful. Orlando Patterson, a Harvard 
sociologist and West Indian native, said he wished others would ‘let sleeping dogs lie.’” 
Rimer & Arenson, supra note 83. 
101 For a critique of the Model Minority image, see Wu, supra note 39, at 244–47.  
102 Lee, supra note 50, at 136 (“[T]he [Model Minority] image serves to divide Asian 
Americans from other racial groups, essentially pitting minorities against each other.”). For 
other examples of racial tension between Asians and other groups, see Allred, supra note 
48, at 74–75.  
103 Chew, supra note 39, at 24; see also Jean Shin, The Asian American Closet, 11 
ASIAN L. J. 1, 3–7 (2004) (discussing the stereotypes that accompany the Model Minority 
image). 
104 Wu, supra note 39, at 230–33 (recounting the arrival and experiences of Chinese 
laborers around the Reconstruction era). Chew, supra note 39, at 9 n.15.  
105 Wu, supra note 39, at 231.  
106 Id.  
107 Wu, supra note 39, at 237. 
108 Id. at 237. 
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As a result of the Model Minority myth,  
 
Asian Americans are isolated from both sides of the black/white 
paradigm. African Americans and Hispanic Americans may resent Asian 
Americans for their perceived success. On the other hand, whites are also 
not eager to claim Asians as their own. The perpetual foreigner 
stereotype109 belies any alliance between Asian Americans and whites, as 
does the very term “model minority.” By specifically calling Asian 
Americans a minority, it sets them apart as the “other.”110  
  
In his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Harlan candidly noted how perceptions 
of Asian Americans as foreigners function to exclude them: “There is a race so 
different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become 
citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, 
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race.”111 
Similarly, immigrant Blacks are cast as Model Black Minorities. They are 
described as “exceptionally motivated,”112 “with an immense drive to succeed by 
traditional standards,”113 and assimilable.114 “[P]ast research has shown that, in the 
employment context, immigrant Blacks are identified as the ‘good Blacks’ or the 
‘model black minority’ when compared to legacy Blacks.”115 Likewise, 
Black/White Biracials are described as “seem[ing] more polite, less hostile, more 
solicitous and easier to get along with than Ascendants.”116 The image ascribed to 
immigrant Blacks and Black/White Biracials as more favored over legacy Blacks 
or Ascendants causes isolation between them. As a result, “biracial black students 
were less likely to feel close to other black students and more likely to report 
extreme or considerable alienation from black students on campus.”117  
Consequently, these model minority myths, conjured by those who view one 
racial group as more deserved than another, can cause interracial and intraracial 
fragmentation. Because qualitative diversity seeks to measure merit by means of 
determining which intraracial group better confers the benefits of diversity, a 
qualitative diversity approach is likely to exacerbate the current fragmentation 
between and among racial groups. 
  
                                                      
109 See Chew, supra note 39, at 33–38 (describing the perception of foreignness). 
110 Allred, supra note 48, at 72–73.  
111 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896). 
112 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 76, at 1170. 
113 Id. at 1170. 
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3.   Is There Room for Asian Americans? 
 
Qualitative diversity, some would argue, has the potential to re-conceptualize 
Asians from a monolithic group to a group with varying ethnicities. The cramped 
view of Asians as a monolithic racial group has harmed Southeast Asians, such as 
Cambodians, Hmong, and Laotians, who are underrepresented.118 “Nearly half of 
all Americans of Southeast Asian descent live in poverty,” and a large percentage 
are first-generation immigrants who fled their home country as political 
refugees.119 While the qualitative diversity approach may hold promise for 
Southeast Asians to break away from the monolithic “Asian” group and to garner 
more seats in America’s colleges, it would require a concomitant nuanced 
conception of diversity that does not mirror the population or applicant pool, as is 
the current trend among higher education institutions. Otherwise, under existing 
caps for Asians, the increased admissions of Southeast Asians would be perceived 
as a “‘negative action’ against highly represented Asian Americans (i.e., Chinese, 
Korean, etc.), as the school would be redistributing spots that otherwise would 
have gone to those groups of Asian Americans.”120  
Whether there is room for more Asians Americans, Blacks, etc. is contingent 
upon a school’s conception of diversity and critical mass. If diversity is capped for 
each racial group in proportion to the applicant pool or population, the contests 
over deservedness will heighten. Thus, whether the debate centers on legacy 
Blacks versus immigrant Blacks, or Southeast Asians versus other Asians, the 
qualitative diversity approach brings us back full circle to the uncomfortable 
discussion of deservedness. 
 
III.  RELIANCE ON STEREOTYPES 
 
For qualitative diversity to be realized, admissions officers would need to sift 
through thousands of applications while making finer distinctions among 
applicants than previously necessitated by the broader diversity rationale. The 
qualitative diversity rationale brings greater temptation for these admissions 
officers to employ stereotypes as a proxy to facilitate expedient considerations of 
the mounds of application files.  
Professor Devon Carbado explains how intraracial diversity might be 
implemented for higher education admissions and uses three hypothetical black 
applicants to illustrate.121 He creates three profiles for an admissions officer to 
                                                      
118 Gee, supra note 45, at 180; Yin, supra note 3, at 113 (noting the differences 
among Cambodians, Hmong, and Laotians as compared to Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, 
Korean, and Indians in obtaining college degrees). 
119 Allred, supra note 48, at 72 (quoting Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian 
Americans: The Internal Instability of Dworkin’s Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARV. 
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consider: Kimberly, who is raised by a single mother in the inner city and attends a 
high school composed mostly of Blacks; Tanisha, who is raised by a policeman 
and a stay-at-home mother and lives in the inner city, but attends school in the 
suburbs; and Rachel, with parents who are a dentist and lawyer, who attends an 
elite private high school and lives in a white neighborhood.122 Professor Carbado 
explores how, depending on the diversity benefit a school seeks to attain, an 
admissions officer would prefer a particular profile over another, thereby making 
intraracial distinctions.  
 
Whether the admissions officer prefers racially salient African 
Americans could turn on the precise diversity benefit she seeks to 
advance. If that officer wants black students who will facilitate racial 
cooperation and understanding, for example, that preferred diversity 
benefit increases the likelihood that the officer will admit Blacks whose 
racial identities are not salient. If, on the other hand, an officer wants 
black students who will make the environment more racially conscious, 
she will likely admit black students whose racial identities are salient.123 
 
The notable problem in any defense of qualitative diversity, as seen in 
Professor Carbado’s illustrations, is the reliance on racial stereotypes. For 
example, Professor Carbado examines whether Rachel, a black applicant of West 
Indian descent, would be an effective debiasing agent to promote the diversity 
benefit of breaking down racial stereotypes.124 He concludes that whether Rachel 
will more effectively advance the goal of dismantling racial stereotypes will 
depend on whether her Caribbean background is salient—whether she outwardly 
displays and embraces her Caribbean heritage.125 “This different treatment,” he 
explains, “is based on the view that Caribbean blacks are not ‘really’ black or that, 
unlike African Americans, they are not ‘negatively’ black. This limits the ability of 
people of Caribbean descent to stand in for African Americans” in a way that could 
alter other students’ views of African Americans.126  
As Professor Carbado ultimately recognizes, “intraracial selections likely 
trade on biases and stereotypes.”127 He explains, “Crudely, and with respect to 
African Americans, we judge them based not only on whether we think they are 
black but also on how stereotypically black, or how race-consciously black, we 
perceive them to be.”128  
Similarly, to advance her argument for greater inclusion of legacy Blacks at 
elite schools, Professor Onwuachi-Willig details the advantages that immigrant 
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Blacks experience. She posits that “mixed-race students and first- and second-
generation Blacks may be better positioned to be admitted to and survive elite 
college and university environments because of the relative ease (compared to 
legacy Blacks) with which they can integrate and assimilate into white circles.”129 
The explanation for this, as Professor Onwuachi-Willig suggests, rests on the 
integration of immigrant Blacks in white neighborhoods.130 Another commentator 
surmises that because immigrant Blacks have a more diverse group of high school 
friends, they are “less likely to find interactions across racial lines to be foreign 
and alienating on campus.”131 Additionally, Professor Onwuachi-Willig contends 
that “acculturation into American society is easier for immigrant Blacks because of 
positive images of hard-working immigrants, which stand in contrast to stereotypes 
of lazy black Americans.”132 Furthermore, Onwuachi-Willig points out that 
“psychological advantages may derive from being a voluntary immigrant as 
opposed to an involuntary immigrant, and such advantages include the self-
assurances of coming from a majority black country with black leaders and role 
models as well as immigrant optimism about future opportunities in the United 
States.”133  
The possibility of a contrary assumption, however, should be recognized—
that immigrant Blacks might have greater difficulty integrating into white 
environments because they previously have been accustomed, more so than legacy 
Blacks, to living in a minority dominant country. Another possibility is that 
immigrant Blacks likely experience greater difficulty in assimilating with Whites 
because they are burdened with navigating through a new economic, social, 
political, cultural, and educational system and establishing a new way of life. 
Again, the purpose of this discussion is not to declare which conclusions are 
correct but to point out that qualitative diversity invites distinctions between 
immigrant Blacks and legacy Blacks and other intraracial groups that are laden 
with stereotypes and presumptions. The irony is that deciding who can better 
confer the benefits of diversity in overcoming racial stereotypes, fostering racial 
understanding, and contributing to a robust classroom discussion begets making 
racial stereotypes.134  
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Critics of affirmative action will quickly point out this irony when qualitative 
diversity distinctions are made. Or, worse, they may even disparage it as 
hypocrisy. A critic might complain that when used negatively, an intraracial 
distinction is bluntly condemned as discrimination, but an interesting conceptual 
reframing takes place when those who want to increase minority representation 
rely on it: it is lauded as promoting intraracial diversity or qualitative diversity. In 
sum, the qualitative diversity approach is fraught with contradictions, and thereby 
strains the diversity rationale. 
 
IV.  THE DILEMMA OF NARROW TAILORING  
 
The battle for affirmative action will be fought over the strict scrutiny test’s 
requirements for necessity and narrow tailoring. Previously, I examined in a 
different work whether a university’s resort to a race-based policy satisfies the 
Court’s demand for showing necessity.135 This part builds upon my prior work by 
exploring whether the qualitative diversity rationale complies with narrow 
tailoring. 
 Because racial classifications, benign or invidious, trigger strict scrutiny, 
defendants must satisfy two prongs: 1) compelling interest and 2) necessity and 
narrow tailoring. “[T]he use of quotas,136 the flexibility of the program,137 the 
duration of the relief,138 the scope of the program,139 individualized 
considerations,140 and the necessity of the program compared with the efficacy of 
race neutral alternatives”141 have been relevant factors in the Court’s determination 
of narrowly tailored.142 In evaluating qualitative diversity for narrow tailoring, the 
approach will be most susceptible to criticisms that it lacks a logical endpoint143 
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because universities will attempt to carry qualitative diversity beyond the macro 
level of the student body population to the microcosm of “small classes”; use the 
approach to achieve racial balancing; and stretch the meaning of qualitative 
diversity to the point of hairsplitting the concept. Moreover, because qualitative 
diversity relies on presumptions about how students’ race affects how they act and 
think, and how others will react and feel, it is likely to fail narrow tailoring. 
 
A.   No Logical Endpoint  
 
1.  Student Population versus Classroom Population 
 
UT Austin’s recent deployment of the diversity rationale seeks to extend 
diversity to a finer level—from the student body population to the classroom 
population. According to the university’s study, in “classes with 10 to 24 students, 
[it] found that 89% of those classes had either one or zero African–American 
students, 41% had one or zero Asian–American students, and 37% had either one 
or zero Hispanic students.”144 One scholar contends that  
 
[t]hese small classes are presumably the classroom settings where racial 
stereotypes could be broken down and cross-racial understanding could 
be fostered, and unless there are at least two students of any group, there 
cannot be diverse perspectives represented from that group. In that sense, 
diversity within racial groups was implicit in UT’s concept of critical 
mass, although not stated directly.145  
 
The university revised its earlier study that surveyed classes containing 
between five and twenty-four students, perhaps because of its realization that it is 
numerically impossible for a class with fewer than ten students to contain at least 
two students from every racial group (White, Black, Hispanic/Latino, Native 
American, and Asian American).146 Even if a significant number of minorities 
were admitted, it would still be a statistical challenge to produce a class of ten 
students, with exactly two students representing each race. The university’s 
constrained conception of diversity in small classes contorts the critical mass 
calculus. 
Now that the Fisher II Court has embraced the diversity rationale in smaller 
classes, it is no stretch of the imagination that higher education institutions will 
                                                      
undefined) for qualitative diversity will be reached.’ UT’s intra-racial diversity rationale is 
thus too imprecise to permit strict scrutiny analysis.” (citations omitted)). 
144 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 225 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and 
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2017] QUALITATIVE DIVERSITY 449 
 
push the boundary to advocate for qualitative diversity in those small classes.147 
Thus, although a small class might be racially diverse, having the minimum of two 
students from each racial group as suggested by one scholar, a university might 
likely argue that race-based admissions are still needed to achieve qualitative 
diversity in these classes. Again, it would be a statistical feat to enroll at least two 
students of each intraracial group in these small classes. Consider the following: 1) 
there are 562 tribes or federally recognized Indian Nations in the U.S.;148 2) the 
U.S. Census recognizes Asians to include “a person having origins in any of the 
original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent, 
including, for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam”;149 3) the U.S. Census also applies 
“[t]he Black racial category [to] include[] people who marked the ‘Black, African 
Am., or Negro’ checkbox. . . . [or] respondents who reported entries such as 
African American; Sub-Saharan African entries, such as Kenyan and Nigerian; and 
Afro-Caribbean entries, such as Haitian and Jamaican”;150 and 4) the U.S. Census 
applies the “Hispanic or Latino” category to include “a person of Cuban, Mexican, 
Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin 
regardless of race.”151 In light of the innumerable intraracial groups, achieving 
intraracial diversity in small classes would require increasing class enrollment to 
include more than fifty students, which would obviate the very purpose of a small 
class, in order to allow for two students from each ethnicity or intraracial group to 
enroll. The university might respond that it would not carry the qualitative 
diversity to this extreme, but critics might not be comforted by this assurance. 
 
2.   Racial Balancing  
 
Furthermore, critics would point out that a university’s objective to have each 
racial group represented in small classes would amount to racial balancing. These 
small classes are likely elective classes, which students enroll in to satisfy their 
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chosen major, and are driven by a student’s choice.152 Studies show that particular 
professions or majors attract more students of a certain racial group—that “race 
and ethnicity affects major choice.”153 A study found, for example, that “[f]or 
engineering and computer science, slightly smaller shares of black and Hispanic 
males choose this field of study compared with white males. In their freshman 
year, Asian and other males, including foreign students, are much more likely than 
white males to identify a major in engineering and computer science.”154 As I have 
pointed out in my earlier work, “designing admissions procedures for the purpose 
of reflecting a population’s diversity would violate the Court’s prohibition on 
racial balancing.”155 Similarly, using race-based admissions to attain diversity or 
qualitative diversity in small classes in proportion to the general population or 
student body population would offend the Court’s jurisprudential constraints.156 
The Court has found it “‘completely unrealistic’ to expect that ‘minorities will 
choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local 
population’”157 and unequivocally held that “[r]acial balancing is not to be 
achieved for its own sake.”158  
 
3.  Hairsplitting Qualitative Diversity 
 
 The qualitative diversity approach has no logical endpoint because intraracial 
diversity is susceptible to hairsplitting. Who is sufficiently diverse, and to what 
degree do we measure diversity? As previously discussed, students who were part 
descendants of minority groups but grew up in a white household could not claim 
minority status without being accused as frauds.159 In one situation, genetic testing 
confirmed that a pair of twins, who grew up with adoptive white parents, were 
“nine percent Native American and eleven percent North African.”160 Thus, these 
students were one-fifth minority, yet they could not claim minority status without 
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insinuations of misrepresentation.161 Ironically, these students had a greater 
biological claim to minority status than Homer Plessy, who was only one-eighth 
Black and lacked any Afro-centric phenotypes.162 Query, if Homer Plessy were 
applying for admissions, would we allow him to check the Black box? 
 The implementation of qualitative diversity requires institutions of higher 
education to discern “racial merit,” which at bottom depends on one’s definition of 
race. Although the debate over racial box checking is not new within the broader 
diversity discussion, qualitative diversity can potentially draw the controversy to a 
new height because whether race is a biological or social construct163 is 
contested.164  
The ready availability of genetic testing has advanced our understanding of 
race, but in the process, it raises difficult questions that must be grappled with in 
applying qualitative diversity. For instance, researchers at 23andMe, a private 
genetic testing company, found that 
 
people who identified as African-American had genes that were only 
73.2 percent African. European genes accounted for 24 percent of their 
DNA, while .8 percent came from Native Americans. Latinos, on the 
other hand, had genes that were on average 65.1 percent European, 18 
percent Native American, and 6.2 percent African. The researchers found 
that European-Americans had genomes that were on average 98.6 
percent European, .19 percent African, and .18 Native American.165  
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If race is a biological construct, the results of the 23andMe research leads to 
questions about how qualitative diversity addresses the genetic melting pot that is 
America. Historically, racial classifications were made based on blood quantum. 
For example, hypodescent laws ascribed persons with one drop of blood from 
black ancestry as Black.166 Although hypodescent laws were used as a vehicle to 
discriminate against minorities,167 the blood quantum principle underlying 
hypodescent laws can be redeployed as a vehicle for inclusion. A reliance on 
genetic results would be consistent with the biological approach to racial 
classification and would entitle people, such as the adoptive twins mentioned 
above, to check the minority box(es).  
On the other hand, if race is a social construct, then Rachel Dolezal, the 
former President of the Spokane chapter of the NAACP, can legitimately claim she 
is Black. Yet, Rachel Dolezal has been vilified as a fraud because she is 
biologically white but claimed to be black on an application.168 Dolezal grew up 
with four adoptive Black siblings; attended Howard University, an HBCU; became 
an activist for African Americans through her work with the NAACP; and assumed 
a black appearance.169 That Dolezal identifies as Black is unquestionable.170 
Ironically, Professor Onwuachi-Willig’s definition of race as “a social construct, 
which makes one’s race just as much about how others perceive him or her as it 
does about how one identifies or perceives oneself,”171 should permit Dolezal to 
check the box for Black on her application, but would prevent the adoptive twins 
discussed above from doing so because they “share none of the social and 
psychological experiences of being a racial minority.”172 
Moreover, biracial or multiracial students prompt questions of which racial 
category may students claim. Should President Barrack Obama, who is half-White 
and half-Black, was raised by his white mother and abandoned by his black father, 
and is a second generation immigrant be permitted to identify as Black on an 
application?173 Consider Tiger Woods, whose mother is “half-Thai, one-quarter 
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Chinese and one-quarter white” and whose father is “half-black, one-quarter 
American Indian, and one-quarter Chinese.”174 Although Tiger Woods publicly 
refused to be labeled singularly as African American and coined his own identity 
as “Cablinasian” to reflect his Caucasian, Black, Native American, and Asian 
heritage, may he check the Black box on a college application and receive racial 
preference for college admission?175 Or because he descends from a greater 
combined percentage of Asian ancestry, must Tiger Woods check the Asian box 
and suffer the admissions cap that some elite universities apply to Asian 
Americans? 
 
B.  The Guessing Game 
 
Qualitative diversity is based on fuzzy notions of what viewpoints or 
contributions certain subpopulations of a particular race can make and, ultimately, 
is nothing more than mere guesswork at what an applicant may think or feel. In 
formulating a potential defense for UT Austin, Professor Carbado offers that “UT 
could . . . . argue that students who grow up in racially segregated neighborhoods 
and attend racially segregated schools might not be the best diversity candidates to 
facilitate racial cooperation and understanding because they will have had little or 
no exposure to whites or other nonblacks.”176 He admits that the school may be 
mistaken, but nonetheless its decision would comport with “good faith.”177  
Qualitative diversity is fraught with presumptions about how people act, 
think, believe, and want. Whether presumptions are sufficient to satisfy the 
constitutional mandate of “good faith” is questionable. Even more tenuous is 
whether admission decisions founded on such presumptions are narrowly tailored.  
First, it is important to clear up any ambiguity about the meaning of good 
faith. One must ascertain whether good faith pertains to the compelling interest 
prong or the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny. The Grutter Court made two 
distinct conclusions concerning good faith that can be interpreted to require good 
faith for both prongs.  The first conclusion stated,  
  
                                                      
life/t/obamas-true-colors-black-white-or-neither/#.VzfN5_krLIU [https://perma.cc/RMD2-
A763]; Jason Carroll, Behind the Scenes: Is Barack Obama Black or Biracial?, CNN 
POLITICS (June 9, 2008, 3:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/06/09/btsc.obama 
.race/index.html?iref=newssearch%20 [https://perma.cc/S8JA-PFEP]. 
174 Oliver Brown, Why Tiger Woods Refused to Play the Race Card Against His 
Former Caddie Steve Williams, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 9, 2011, 10:30 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/golf/tigerwoods/8879865/Why-Tiger-Woods-refused-to-
play-the-race-card-against-his-former-caddie.html [https://perma.cc/Z3SD-ZHWW]. 
175 Id.; Brown & Bell, supra note 15, at 1259. 
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[T]hat the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student 
body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at 
the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional mission, and that “good 
faith” on the part of a university is “presumed” absent “a showing to the 
contrary.”178  
 
The second conclusion stated, “Narrow tailoring does, however, require serious, 
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the 
diversity the university seeks.”179 The first statement concerning good faith 
pertains to the compelling interest prong—that the Court will presume good faith 
in a school’s determination that diversity is necessary for its mission—and is 
distinct from the second statement, which is focused on the narrow tailoring prong.  
Perhaps under previous interpretations of Grutter, presumptions about what 
students think, feel, and want with regards to their classmates might go 
unquestioned because some courts erroneously interpreted Grutter as conferring 
substantial deference to schools for both prongs of strict scrutiny, namely as to 
whether diversity is central to their mission and the means chosen to achieve 
diversity. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Fisher  
 
held that to “second-guess the merits” of this aspect of the University’s 
decision was a task it was “ill-equipped to perform” and that it would 
attempt only to “ensure that [the University’s] decision to adopt a race-
conscious admissions policy followed from [a process of] good faith 
consideration.” The Court of Appeals thus concluded that “the narrow-
tailoring inquiry—like the compelling-interest inquiry—is undertaken 
with a degree of deference to the Universit[y].”180 
 
 The deference conferred to schools in evaluating narrow tailoring has been 
the subject of much scholarly criticism, and ultimately, the Supreme Court in 
Fisher I clarified that Grutter intended for courts to evaluate the narrow tailoring 
prong without ceding deference to schools: “Strict scrutiny does not permit a court 
to accept a school’s assertion that its admissions process uses race in a permissible 
way without a court giving close analysis to the evidence of how the process works 
in practice.”181  
 Under Fisher’s stringent adherence to narrow tailoring, a school’s use of race 
to attain qualitative diversity might appear specious when presumptions are made 
about students’ racial mentality and behavior. The Court has rejected treating 
                                                      
178 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003). 
179 Id. at 339. 
180 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013), vacated 
and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 186 L. Ed. 2d 474 (2013) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 236 (5th Cir. 2011)). For an analysis of 
Fisher’s impact on the narrow tailoring inquiry, see Ngov, supra note 1.  
181 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
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people differently based on presumptions about how their racial background might 
affect their actions and thoughts. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Commission,182 Justice O’Connor’s dissent maintained that 
“[s]ocial scientists may debate how peoples’ thoughts and behavior reflect their 
background, but the Constitution provides that the Government may not allocate 
benefits and burdens among individuals based on the assumption that race or 
ethnicity determines how they act or think.”183 
 
V.   RETHINKING DIVERSITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
Scholarly works are replete with critiques of affirmative action, and they need 
not be repeated here. Rather, in this Part, this Article highlights a few possible 
challenges that critics might lodge against affirmative action as they specifically 
relate to the qualitative diversity rationale. The concerns analyzed in this part serve 
to alert advocates to the danger that a push to advance the qualitative diversity 
rationale might invite the Court to reexamine whether diversity is a compelling 
purpose. Although Fisher did not challenge diversity as a compelling interest,184 
the Court is primed to reconsider it in future litigation.185  
 
A.  Elusive Justifications for Affirmative Action 
 
The first concern is that a qualitative diversity approach propounds the 
problems that inhere in the broader diversity rationale. Scholars, even those who 
support affirmative action, have questioned the efficacy of the diversity rationale 
as a vehicle for promoting affirmative action.186 
                                                      
182 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200 (1995). 
183 Id. at 602 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Metro found 
vindication in her later authored majority opinion in Adarand. Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
184 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (“There is disagreement about whether Grutter was 
consistent with the principles of equal protection in approving this compelling interest in 
diversity. But the parties here do not ask the Court to revisit that aspect of Grutter’s 
holding.” (citations omitted)). 
185 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
186 For example, Professor Samuel Issacharoff has pondered the deployment of the 
diversity rationale and pointed out its limits on fully realizing diversity: 
 
[I]f diversity of the learning environment is the real objective behind affirmative 
action, one must wonder why preferential admission is limited to groups that are 
defined to some extent by histories of being subject to official discrimination. 
As the philosopher George Sher asks, 
 
 
456 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
 
 Professor Derrick Bell identified four concerns with the diversity rationale: 
 
1) Diversity enables courts and policymakers to avoid addressing directly 
the barriers of race and class that adversely affect so many applicants; 2) 
Diversity invites further litigation by offering a distinction without a real 
difference between those uses of race approved in college admissions 
programs, and those in other far more important affirmative action 
policies that the Court has rejected; 3) Diversity serves to give 
undeserved legitimacy to the heavy reliance on grades and test scores 
that privilege well-to-do, mainly white applicants; and 4) The 
tremendous attention directed at diversity programs diverts concern and 
resources from the serious barriers of poverty that exclude far more 
students from entering college than are likely to gain admission under an 
affirmative action program.187 
 
Professor Richard Ford criticized the diversity rationale for “essentializ[ing] 
minorities by ascribing certain characteristics to them and requiring racial 
minorities to ‘perform’ stereotyped versions of their identities in order to justify 
their presence within institutions.”188  
 Additionally, some researchers question whether diversity truly enhances a 
student’s educational experience.189 Two studies are worth examining.190 These 
                                                      
For even if diversity yields every one of the intellectual benefits that are claimed 
for it, why should we benefit most when the scholarly community contains 
substantial numbers of blacks, women, Hispanics, (American) Indians, Aleuts, 
and Chinese-Americans? Why not focus instead, or in addition, on Americans of 
Eastern European, Arabic, or (Asian) Indian extraction? For that matter, can’t 
we achieve even greater benefit by extending preference to native Africans, 
Asians, Arabs, and Europeans? 
 
Samuel Issacharoff, Law and Misdirection in the Debate over Affirmative Action, 2002 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 11, 22 (2002); see also Brandon Paradise, Racially Transcendent Diversity, 
50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 415, 422 (2012) (“To remedy the diversity rationale’s failure to 
ensure racial diversity some scholars have continued to argue that the Court’s amorphous 
concept of diversity should be replaced with a substantive understanding of diversity that 
acknowledges the special significance of racial diversity over diversity factors with less 
normative importance . . . .”); Yin, supra note 3, at 95–96 (“[N]ot all affirmative action 
defenders fully support the diversity theory, and some others openly admit that they 
promote diversity primarily because it is the justification that the Supreme Court has 
permitted for affirmative action programs.”).  
187 Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003). 
188 Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2168 (2013) (quoting 
RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL CULTURE 59–64 (2005)). 
189 See, e.g., Charles A. O’Reilly III et al., Work Group Demography, Social 
Integration, and Turnover, 34 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 21, 29–30 (1989) (concluding that 
homogeneity increases social integration and reduces turnover); Leong, supra note 188, at 
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studies concluded that those “who attended historically Black universities reported 
better academic performance, greater social involvement, and higher occupational 
aspirations than Black students who attended predominantly White institutions.”191 
Because of their small sample size, the studies’ statistical significance should not 
be overstated. But if these studies can be further validated, they suggest that 
African Americans, and maybe all minorities, are better off in minority-majority 
schools192 and give us pause to question who really benefits from diversity or 
qualitative diversity. 
 
B.  Diversity as a Means to an End for Whites 
 
The qualitative diversity approach, much like the general diversity rationale, 
utilizes individuals, particularly minorities, for the actualization of benefits that 
accrue to the class and institution. In this way, the qualitative diversity approach is 
prone to the criticism that the presence of minorities for cross racial understanding 
and overcoming racial stereotypes benefits Whites,193 and substantiates Professor 
Derrick Bell’s interest convergence theory that nonwhites only progress when it 
benefits Whites.194 
In the same vein as Professor Bell’s theory, Professor Nancy Leong develops 
a theory of racial capitalism that highlights the commodification of nonwhites for 
social utility.195 She identifies the harms to nonwhites resulting from racial 
capitalism to include “fractur[ing] identity, creat[ing] pressure for nonwhite people 
                                                      
2166. For an excellent analysis of the social science data on the benefits of diversity, see 
Justin Pidot, Note, Intuition or Proof: The Social Science Justification for the Diversity 
Rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, 59 STAN. L. REV. 761 (2006). 
Pidot concludes that “[d]espite all of these data, no clear picture emerges. Virtually all of 
the studies have some degree of methodological flaw, and, at best, correlations exist 
between certain types of experiences (which may or may not be correlated with numeric 
diversity) and certain positive outcomes. Even these correlations, however, explain little of 
the variance in outcomes.” Id. at 794. Contra Charles E. Daye et al., Does Race Matter in 
Educational Diversity? A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 13 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 75, 
76 (2012) (concluding that diversity improves educational quality). 
190 See Pidot, supra note 189, at 794 (evaluating studies about the educational benefits 
of diversity). 
191 See id. 
192 I am cognizant that this question might invoke criticisms of paternalism. I am 
mindful of Professor Kermit Roosevelt III’s insightful commentary regarding Justice 
Thomas’s reference to the mismatch theory: “Their claim, remember, is that attending an 
elite school will ultimately prove harmful to minority students . . . and that, therefore, this 
option should be taken away from them. That is paternalism, plain and simple.” Kermit 
Roosevelt III, The Ironies of Affirmative Action, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 729, 750 (2015).  
193 Leong, supra note 188, at 2171.  
194 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
195 Leong, supra note 188, at 2152. 
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to engage in particular identity performances, and inflict[ing] economic harm by 
placing nonwhite people at the greater mercy of the market.”196 By connecting 
racial identity formation’s importance to self-esteem, she posits that racial 
capitalism “dissociates racial identity from the individual.”197 Additionally, racial 
capitalism forces nonwhites to perform in a way that alters their identity.198 As an 
example, nonwhite individuals may be encouraged to emphasize their 
nonwhiteness to enhance their consideration for admissions under the diversity 
rationale,199 or to distance themselves from their nonwhiteness to form a more 
favorable version of themselves.200 Additionally, she identifies the societal harms 
wreaked by racial capitalism, which approximate those identified by Professor Bell 
in his critique of diversity’s distractions.201 The societal harms include 
“impoverish[ing] our discourse around race, foster[ing] racial resentment, and 
ultimately displac[ing] more meaningful antiracism measures.”202  
Qualitative diversity relies on racial capitalism in that an individual’s worth is 
measured by the individual’s contribution to the school and class. In doing so, 
qualitative diversity can create the types of societal and individual harms that 
Professor Leong described. For example, to appeal to admissions officers, 
nonwhite individuals might engage in identity performance to a greater degree 
under the qualitative diversity approach because they must now emphasize their 
nonwhiteness to distinguish themselves from other intraracial individuals, i.e., they 
are “more black” than the other Black applicants. Or conversely, they might 
conceal or minimize their nonwhiteness to separate themselves from other 
nonwhites in their racial group, i.e., they are “not as black” as the other Black 
applicants. The harm to identity formation is greater under the pursuit for 
qualitative diversity because the nonwhite must reconcile not only her 
disassociation of her identity from her true self, but also her disassociation of her 
racial group. As applicants employ strategies to cloak their intraracial identity, they 
confine themselves to a “closet [that] can become an ‘identity prison.’”203 As for 
the societal harms, qualitative diversity requires a more nuanced examination into 
the diversity benefits each intraracial applicant can provide, and by burying our 
noses in the minutiae of intraracial qualities, we become more divorced from the 
structural barriers that created the original inequities that affirmative action was 
intended to remedy. 
 
                                                      
196 Id. at 2204. 
197 Id. at 2205. 
198 Id., at 2207. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 2208. For additional in-depth discussion about the strategy of “covering” as 
a coping mechanism and means to assimilate, see Shin, supra note 103, at 1–2 (exploring 
how Asians “closet” themselves much like homosexuals to avoid social disapproval). 
201 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
202 Leong, supra note 188, at 2213. 
203 Shin, supra note 103, at 22. 
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C.   Pandering to the Majority 
 
As minorities become consumed with distinguishing themselves from their 
intraracial cohorts, they fall prey to pandering to the majoritarian conception of 
qualitative diversity. In his thoughtful work on intraracial diversity, Professor 
Carbado provides suggestions on how a university can implement qualitative 
diversity to realize the benefits of diversity. For example, he elaborates on how the 
UT Austin could have asserted the goal of stereotype negation to defend its pursuit 
of qualitative diversity: 
 
The university could believe that white students will perceive the black 
students who are admitted under the Ten Percent Law as racially 
salient—that is, as students who attended the black schools and/or lived 
in the black neighborhoods. More colorfully, white students could 
perceive these students as “really” black and attribute a range of negative 
racial stereotypes to them. Alternatively, the university might believe 
that white students will experience these African American admittees as 
overly racially conscious and thus racially uncomfortable to be around. 
None of the foregoing dynamics are helpful in terms of negating negative 
racial stereotypes. Indeed, all of them, in one way or another, activate 
racial stereotypes.204  
 
Aside from the fact that the above suggestions rely on a double dose of racial 
stereotypes—what black students from the Top Ten Percent Plan can contribute 
and what white students think of these students—they raise another objection that 
critics might launch: pandering to the majority. The above example suggests that 
white students’ discomfort around students perceived as “really” black can guide 
an admission officer’s decision to prefer and admit a black student who is “less” 
black, thereby giving credence to the “discomfort” felt by whites in the name of 
“negating negative racial stereotypes.”205 Such acquiescence to the discomfort of 
whites implicates discrimination concerns, contradicting the original purpose of 
dismantling racial stereotypes and the Court’s jurisprudence.  
The Court has consistently denounced acquiescence to a heckler’s veto as a 
sufficient constitutional basis for discrimination. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc.,206 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a city council’s 
refusal to grant a special use permit for a facility intended for the mentally 
retarded.207 One basis for the council’s refusal was premised on its concern about 
“the negative attitude of the majority of property owners” and “fears of elderly” 
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neighbors.208 The Court rebuked the city’s assent to those fears: “But mere 
negative attitudes, or fear, . . . are not permissible bases for treating a home for the 
mentally retarded differently . . . . It is plain that . . . the City may not avoid the 
strictures of [the Equal Protection] Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections 
of some fraction of the body politic.”209  
Similarly, in Palmore v. Sidoti,210 the Supreme Court invalidated the removal 
of a child from a white mother’s custody simply because she remarried a black 
man.211 The state court had divested the mother’s custody due to fear of the social 
stigma that the child might face growing up with a black stepparent.212 The 
Supreme Court reiterated that “[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices 
but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, 
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”213  
Finally, qualitative diversity decisions that tinker with the racial makeup of an 
entering class or small classroom based on the sensitivities of whites or other racial 
groups bear a strong resemblance to allowing customers to influence an 
employer’s hiring decision based on race. In the employment context, it is 
abundantly clear, as a constitutional matter as well as statutory, that employment 
practices cannot be driven by the consumer’s racial preference. “Race and color—
the other two grounds of discrimination that are made unlawful by Title VII—are 
omitted, and certainly not by an oversight. . . . Title VII is a blanket prohibition of 
racial discrimination, rational and irrational alike, even more so than of other forms 
of discrimination attacked in Title VII.”214 Just as employment decisions cannot be 
substantiated on customers’ racial preferences, neither can admissions decisions—
even for intraracial distinctions.  
 
D.  Gaming the System  
 
By subjecting themselves to guessing about the majoritarian preferences of an 
institution, minority students make themselves vulnerable to gaming the system. 
The Court has been keen to note the “perverse incentives” created by the class rank 
system, which encourages students to stay in lower performing schools.215 Yet, it 
failed to recognize the “perverse incentives” presented by the qualitative diversity 
approach. Qualitative diversity invites students to game the system by minimizing 
or maximizing intraracial attributes in order to take advantage of racial 
preferences. 
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 Professor Carbado provides examples of how Blacks can work their identity to 
become attractive in a qualitative diversity sense: “I illustrate the subtle but 
significant ways in which applicants can ‘blacken’ or ‘whiten’ their applications in 
relation to their sense of the specific racial types an institution might want to 
admit.”216 He offers the following example: 
 
A student of Trinidadian descent, for example, might highlight that 
background in the hope that an admissions official will assume that he is 
a “good” black—a black who is likely to fit into a predominantly white 
school and not trigger stereotypes about blackness. Alternatively, that 
very same student might worry that highlighting his Trinidadian 
background could render him less authentically black from the 
perspective of an admissions official and thus not a good candidate for 
advancing that school’s preferred diversity benefit. He may choose 
instead, then, to emphasize the fact that he lives in Inglewood, a 
predominantly working class African American neighborhood south of 
the city of Los Angeles. In short, whether a black applicant plays up the 
Caribbean background or his upbringing in Inglewood, there is an 
incentive for him to cloak himself in the characteristics that he thinks 
best mimic the diversity goals he believes an admissions committee 
wants to instantiate.217 
 
As previously discussed, encouraging students to work their identities in pursuit of 
qualitative diversity points causes individual and societal harms through racial 
capitalism.  
 Additionally, it must be recognized that all players may begin to game the 
system. When Whites engage in working their identity, it would be unfair to cry 
foul. For example, when students who discover their multiethnicity through 
genetic testing decide to identify as a minority for admissions purposes, they are 
criticized for taking advantage of the system and chastised as dishonest.218 We 
must be prepared for the prospect that qualitative diversity opens the door to 
greater racial identity construction by all involved and greater manipulation of the 
admissions process. Lowell High School serves as a lesson on how affirmative 
action, initiated for corrective justice, evolved into “affirmative action for 
whites.”219 Similarly, affirmative action advocates must be cautious about the 
potential for the qualitative diversity approach to be appropriated as a mechanism 
for advancing Whites.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Much energy has been exerted and ink spilled over debating the merits of the 
diversity rationale and affirmative action. A qualitative diversity approach is likely 
to lead us deeper into the morass. It invites questions of deservedness; 
presumptions about how a person’s race affects the way others act, think, and feel; 
applicants to manipulate their intraracial attributes in order to game the system; 
and balkanization of intraracial groups. The qualitative diversity approach subjects 
applicants to work their identity to appeal to a majoritarian construction of 
diversity and results in greater harm to the individual and society. In the end, the 
qualitative diversity approach, which was intended to bring us together through 
robust discussions, gains in cross racial understanding, and dismantling racial 
stereotypes, threatens to propel us further apart. 
